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Abstract
Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated
economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer’s
concept of club eﬃciency under a variable number of economic agents. We
extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. We
show that given certain conditions the equivalence of club eﬃcient allocations
and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public
club goods. We also show that extension to a more general class of economies
seems implausible.
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Lindahl equilibrium is a well-known solution concept in the general equilibrium theory
of public goods, but its competitive basis has been questioned. In this paper we show
that if the public goods are not pure but feature some form of rivalry in terms of
opportunity costs, Lindahl pricing within a club with a variable membership base
has a ﬁrm competitive basis.
We will do so in the context of Schweizer’s (1983) model of club eﬃciency. This
model assumes that the club is “open” and has a variable membership base, drawn
from an unlimited pool of potential members in the background. The issue of how
to partition a given population of agents in a number of clubs is not addressed.
The possible variation of the numbers of consumers amounts to replication of the
economy and the club eﬃciency of an allocation indicates that the latter remains
in the core. To explain the concept, a membership proﬁle with private and club
good consumption plans (for each type of agents) is feasible if the consumption plans
are producible with the initial wealth of the club members and it is club eﬃcient if
no other feasible membership proﬁle yields higher utility to all members. Schweizer
(1983) shows that a club eﬃcient allocation must be a Walrasian equilibrium for an
economy with private goods and that agents whose numbers are variable do not and
should not pay for any public good. These results consolidate the limit core theorem
and the Henry George theorem, respectively.
One of the problems of the original formulation of Schweizer (1983) is that the
use of a pure public good is unrealistic due to the non-crowding hypothesis. In this
paper we try to remedy this particular problem and introduce intermediate types of
goods. We investigate when a club eﬃcient equilibrium is a Lindahl equilibrium.
Crowding does not enter the utility functions directly. The utility of an agent de-
pends exclusively on his or her own consumption of private goods and club goods. The
degree of “publicness” of club goods is determined by the costs of production. A cost
function expresses the input requirements of a membership proﬁle (the composition
of a club by type of agents) for each level of club goods consumption (possibly varying
by type of agents). In the polar cases of private and public goods, the cost function
would be linear or constant, respectively. The main contribution of this paper is the
delineation of cost functions of club goods such that a club eﬃcient allocation is a
Lindahl equilibrium. One may expect to encounter the membership proﬁle of such a
club eﬃcient allocation in an economy with a sea of agents, not plagued by integer
problems. More interesting, the prices of a club eﬃcient allocation are Lindahl prices.
It can be shown that the Debreu-Scarf limit core property, the Walrasian equilibrium
1concept, and club eﬃciency are equivalent for economies with purely private goods.1
The public goods literature knows a tricky division as regards the exogeneity or
endogeneity of the number of consumers and the level of the public goods. In the
older literature, going back to Foley (1970), the number of consumers is ﬁxed and
the level of the public goods is variable. He deﬁned a Lindahl equilibrium as a set of
prices, economy-wide for private goods and individualized for public goods, such that
markets clear. Foley proceeded to demonstrate that Lindahl equilibria are in the core.
Ellickson (1973) showed that a Lindahl equilibrium need no longer be in the core when
public goods are not pure, but have opportunity costs that increase with the number
of consumers; he also showed that the core may even be empty. His negative results
stem directly from the fact that the aggregate technology set may not be convex. We
follow Ellickson in admitting non-pure public goods, but the aggregate technology will
be assumed convex, keeping scope for positive results. Milleron (1972) replicated the
number of consumers, which remains exogenous. The trouble with pure public goods
is that they are not replicated and their per capita opportunity costs vanish. To keep
the Lindahl equilibria in the core, Milleron changed the preferences or endowments of
the consumers as the economy becomes large. Even then the core did not shrink to
the set of Lindahl equilibria in his paper. Vasil’ev, Weber, and Wiesmeth (1995) were
able to let the core shrink to the set of Lindahl equilibria, but also had to change
consumers (in fact, their utility functions) as they were replicated. Conley (1994)
obtained this result assuming that consumers are either asymptotically satiated or
strictly nonsatiated in public goods; these are extreme polar cases of consumer utility
functions. We need no such assumptions in the context of semi-public goods.
The roles of consumer numbers and public good levels were reversed in Schweizer
(1983). He solved for club allocations, including a membership proﬁle. On the other
hand, he ﬁxed the level of the public goods, not necessarily at a desired level. He
provided “Lindahlian” price support of club eﬃcient allocations, but had to assume
that some types of agents are given in ﬁxed numbers. The other types escape taxation
as they can bring in more members of their types and, thus, may spread the burden of
a contribution to the pure public good. We follow Schweizer in letting the numbers
of consumers be free, but the public goods will be neither pure nor ﬁxed, and be
determined by preferences.
We look at the provision of club goods with a semi-public nature. Such goods are
1An indirect proof can be based on noting that Schweizer (1983) showed equivalence of the
Walrasian equilibrium concept and club eﬃciency. Debreu and Scarf (1963) showed equivalence of
Walrasian equilibria and the limit core. Hence, club eﬃciency, the Walrasian equilibrium concept,
and the limit core property are the same.
2commodities of an intermediate nature. It is assumed that these commodities are
provided through a club, and therefore are principally locally collective. But their
rivalry properties might be diﬀerent from that of a purely local public good. We
model this by means of a cost function that associates input requirements with mem-
bers’ demands for these club goods. Our main theorem states that for certain club
goods with a semi-public nature the notions of club eﬃciency and Lindahl equilib-
rium remain equivalent. For this we extend Schweizer’s (1983) equivalence theorem
(of Walrasian equilibrium and club eﬃciency) to a model in which the aggregation
function for the club goods has a certain speciﬁcation and certain properties. We also
show that it cannot be expected that our Lindahl equivalence result can be extended
further to more general speciﬁcations of the aggregation function.
The second section develops the model, Section 3 states and proves our equiva-
lence result, and Section 4 concludes the paper with a discussion of the result, its
relationship to the literature, and its implications.
2 Clubs and semi-public club goods
In this section we introduce a model of a club consisting of a variable membership
base, an allocation of private goods consumed, and an allocation of so-called club
goods, which are provided collectively. In our theory we use a club as a replication
device discussed in the previous section.
We consider an economy with a ﬁnite set of consumer types denoted by t =
1,...,T. A vector n ∈ RT
+ represents a proﬁle of a coalition of economic agents,
comprising nt members of type t. A proﬁle n ∈ RT
+ forms the membership base of a
club. Throughout we assume that agents of the same type are treated equally, i.e.,
agents of the same type consume the same quantities of private as well as club goods.
This assumption enables us to discuss replication properly. In the standard model of
a replicated pure exchange economy, the equal treatment property can be shown as
a proposition (Debreu and Scarf, 1963).
We consider a situation with ` ∈ N private goods. Agents of type t are endowed
with a commodity bundle wt ∈ R`
+. It is assumed that wt > 0 for all t.2 Private
consumption of an agent of type t is now given by xt + wt ∈ R` where xt denotes
the net consumption of type t. A net consumption plan is given by a vector of net
consumption bundles x =
 
x1,...,xT
∈ R`T. Total consumption of private goods in
a club with membership base n ∈ RT





2This means wt = 0, but wt 6= 0.
3There are m ∈ N club goods. Each club good is provided collectively by the club
to its members. Again assuming equal treatment, an agent of type t now consumes
the club goods at levels given by the vector yt ∈ Rm
+. The consumption plan for
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The nature of the club goods is introduced through the production technology
used for their creation. The production technology is represented by the induced cost
function C : RmT
+ → R`
+ which for every membership base n ∈ RT
+ and consumption
plan y ∈ RmT





a bundle of private goods C (y) ∈ R`
+ that is used to create the club goods at these
levels.3 Notice that the membership base and the consumption plan are combined
into the total consumption bundle. Only when costs follow this reduced form, our
analysis applies.
Still, we encompass a number of interesting cases. The club goods have a purely




, where the cost function e C : Rm
+ → R`
+
represents a standard private goods production technology converting the ` private
good inputs into m private good outputs. (This reduces the model to the standard
setting of a pure exchange economy.)
Second, the club goods have a purely public nature in the sense of Schweizer (1983)
if C (y) = Z ∈ R`
+, where Z is some ﬁxed input vector.
Finally, there are many intermediate possibilities, giving the club goods a semi-
public nature. For example, if C(y) = e C(maxt=1,...,T ntyt), where the max operator on
Rm is deﬁned by maxi(y1,y2) = max(y1
i,y2
i), i = 1,...,m and, as before, e C : Rm
+ → R`
+
represents a standard private goods production technology, we can interpret the club
goods to be based on a ﬁxed infrastructure such as a network. The capacity of the
network has to handle the peak demands, which in turn determines the construction
costs. A contemporary example of such a situation is that of the provision of access
to Internet through a so-called “Internet Service Provider” (ISP). One can interpret
an ISP as a club that provides access to Internet services to their members. The
cost function e C introduced here exactly represents the cost structure for such an ISP.
Capacity of the ISP’s server needs to be based on peak demands for Internet access
at the diﬀerent time moments during a standard period of time. These time moments
can be represented by the discrete parameter t.
These examples feature an important commonality, namely convexity. In the
3We may allow substitution of inputs by generalizing C to a correspondence.
4purely public case in the sense of Schweizer, the induced cost function C is constant,
which is obviously convex. In the purely private and semi-public cases, C is induced
by a private goods cost function e C. If e C is convex, as is standard in neoclassical
production theory (excluding increasing returns to scale in production), then so is C
in either case, as the latter is the composition of e C and either summation (of private
goods) or maximization (of semi-public goods). The latter two operations are convex
and the composition of convex operations is convex.





+ is a proﬁle, x =
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x1,...,xT


















Net demands for the private goods and the costs for the provision of the club goods
sum to zero at most.4 For simplicity, there is no production of private goods. Its
inclusion would be a straightforward extension of the model.
A consumer of type t has an extended utility function Ut : R` ×Rm → R over his
total private and club good consumption. However, since his initial endowment wt is
ﬁxed, we may simply write Ut(xt,yt). In principle we allow an agent to have short
positions in all commodities.




0)t=1,...,T. The club (nt,xt,yt)t=1,...,T is an improvement




















0)t=1,...,T is called club eﬃcient, following Schweizer (1983).
A feasible club (nt
0,xt
0,yt
0)t=,...,T is a Lindahl equilibrium if there exist a private
goods price vector p ∈ R`
+ and personalized admission price vectors p1,...,pT ∈ Rm
+
such that the following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. For every t ∈ {1,...,T} with nt






0) = argmax U
t(x
t,y




4We remark that Schweizer (1983) introduces a given endowment for the club, denoted by F = 0,
that covers the provision costs of the public goods and the net demands for private goods. In that
case, in equation (1) the zero is replaced by F. Here we limit our discussion to the case without
such an endowment.
52. The club (nt
0,xt
0,yt





















3. The club (nt
0,xt
0,yt















By the ﬁrst condition, consumers maximize their utility given the market prices for
the private goods and the personal admission prices for the semi-public club goods.
The fees collected cover the costs of the provision of the club goods by the second
condition. The third condition stipulates that a public administration is in charge of
the provision of the club goods and admission prices, and as such has the objective
to maximize its “proﬁts.” (This maximal proﬁt is zero by the second condition.)
This condition is not included by the authors who consider the number of consumers
exogenous. (See Foley, 1970, and others referenced in section 1.) However, since
our theorem will entail that club eﬃciency implies Lindahl pricing, the result is
only strengthened by the inclusion of the third condition in the deﬁnition of Lindahl
equilibrium.
3 A decentralization result
Relatively little is assumed to arrive at complete decentralization of eﬃcient clubs
through appropriate price systems. Following Foley (1970) and Schweizer (1983),
positivity of prices is ensured to render a complete decentralization through Lindahl
pricing.
Axiom There are two properties that have to be satisﬁed.
(a) For every type t = 1,...,T the utility function Ut is assumed to be continuous,
quasi-concave, and strongly monotonic.
(b) The club good production technology has to be convex in the sense that the
cost function C : RmT
+ → R`
+ is convex.
In the context of this assumption we have the following result.




with a strictly positive endowment,
P
t=1 nt
0wt  0, can be supported as a Lindahl
equilibrium with strictly positive prices.


























In this deﬁnition we let yt be at location 1 + t.
Now for any proﬁle n ∈ RT
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We remark that also D ⊂ R`+mT.
Bt is convex by quasi-concavity of Ut for every type t. Consequently, the set B
is convex. Furthermore, from continuity of Ut for every type t the set B is open as
well.
We show that D is convex. Let (y1,...,yT,z,n) and (b y1,...,b yT,b z,b n) constitute
(but not be) members of D. Deﬁne v =
 
n1y1,...,nTyT
and b v =
 
b n1b y1,...,b nTb yT
.
Then (−C (v) − z,v) ∈ D as well as (−C (b v) − b z,b v) ∈ D.
Now consider λ ∈ [0,1]. We have to show that there exists a tuple (˜ y1,..., ˜ yT, ˜ z, ˜ n)
such that (−C (˜ v) − ˜ z, ˜ v) ∈ D where ˜ v =
 
˜ n1˜ y1,..., ˜ nT ˜ yT
, ˜ v = λv + (1 − λ)b v, and
C (˜ v)+˜ z = λ(C (v) + z)+(1 − λ)(C (b v) + b z). This can be accomplished by selecting
˜ yt = λntyt + (1 − λ)b ntb yt for every t,e nt = 1, and
˜ z = λC (v) + (1 − λ)C (b v) − C (˜ v) + λz + (1 − λ)b z.
Now ˜ v = λv + (1 − λ)b v and by convexity of the cost function C it follows that
˜ z = λC (v) + (1 − λ)C (b v) − C (˜ v) + λz + (1 − λ)b z
= C (λv + (1 − λ)b v) − C (˜ v) + λz + (1 − λ)b z
= λz + (1 − λ)b z.
7Hence, ˜ z = 0 and thus indeed (−C (˜ v) − ˜ z, ˜ v) ∈ D, ﬁnishing the proof that D is
convex.
We deﬁne the cone generated by the feasible set D by
D = {λd |d ∈ D and λ = 0}.
By convexity of D it follows that D is a convex cone.
We claim that B ∩ D = ∅.
Suppose to the contrary that (nt,xt,yt)t=1,...,T constitutes a member of B, (b nt,b yt)t=1,...,T
and b z ∈ R`



























This implies that λ 6= 0. From the equation it now follows that b ntb yt = nt







































0)t=1,...,T. This is a contradiction to the eﬃciency hypothesis.
By the separating hyperplane theorem and the fact that D is a cone and B is
open, there exist p ∈ R`
+ and p1,...,pT ∈ Rm
+ not all equal to zero such that
(p,p
1,...,p
T)B = 0 = (p,p
1,...,p
T)D. (2)
By strong monotonicity of Ut it can be concluded that B is comprehensive, and
therefore p,pt > 0.5 Also, by assumption that the aggregated total endowment is
strictly positive, we may conclude that
P
nt
0pwt > 0. Thus, there is a type t with
nt
0 > 0 and pwt > 0. For this type t an interior consumption plan is feasible with
respect to pxt +ptyt 5 0. Hence, by strong monotonicity and continuity of Ut, using
a standard argument, p  0 as well as pt  0. Hence, by nonzero endowment
assumption, pwt > 0 for all t. By the same argument, all pt  0. We will now prove
that these prices constitute a Lindahl equilibrium.
First, we show the consumer’s utility maximization condition. Suppose that
the tuple given by (xt,0,...,0,yt,0,...,0) — with yt at location 1 + t — satis-
ﬁes Ut(xt,yt) > Ut(xt
0,yt
0). In fact, since p  0, pwt > 0, and the utility function
is strongly monotonic and continuous, the same holds for a pair of slightly smaller
5Here we deﬁne p > 0 if p = 0 and p 6= 0.
8vectors. Now from the separation property (2) and the strict positivity of all prices
it is concluded that pxt + ptyt > 0.
It remains to show that (xt
0,yt
0) satisﬁes the budget condition pxt
0 + ptyt
0 = 0 if
nt
0 > 0. Indeed from the feasibility condition for (nt
0,xt
0,yt
0)t=1,...,T it follows that










































































By strong monotonicity (xt
0,0,...,0,yt
0,0,...,0) belongs to the boundary of Bt ⊂ B.
From (2) it immediately follows that pxt
0 + ptyt
0 = 0. Hence, each term in (3) must
be zero. Since nt
0 = 0 for all types t it now immediately can be concluded that
pxt
0 + ptyt
0 = 0 if nt
0 > 0.
Together with previously shown statement, this proves that (xt
0,yt
0) indeed solves
the consumer’s problem if nt
0 > 0.
Second, we consider the ﬁnancial balance condition. Since, as shown above, each




























where the last equality reﬂects the fact that the feasibility constraint is binding, using
strong monotonicity.
Lastly, we consider the problem of the public administration. As pointed out






















0 ) belongs to the boundary of B as well.




,n1y1,...,nTyT). The value of the former is zero by the just














This proves that (y1
0,...,yT
0 ,n0) indeed solves the public administration’s problem.
9This completes the proof of the theorem. 
With regard to this equivalence theorem we have the following remarks. If the popu-
lation is not replicated, i.e., n0 = (1,...,1), the ﬁnancial balance condition of Lindahl
equilibrium can be simpliﬁed further to
PT
t=1 pty0 = py0. Hence, if only one club good
is supplied and it is designated the numerair, then the admission prices or fees sum
to unity.
Also we emphasize that the converse of the theorem is true, implying that it is
a true equivalence result. A Lindahl equilibrium is always eﬃcient. The proof is an
easy adaptation of Schweizer’s (1983) proof of his second theorem.
Finally, we remark that the implementation of more general club good cost func-
tions is probably very hard. In the next example we consider a cost function that
is more general, but fails to lead to equivalence of eﬃcient clubs and the Lindahl
equilibria. Semi-public goods, as we deﬁned them, have a distinct structure in that
only total consumption by type, y = (n1y1,...,nTyT) ∈ RmT
+ , aﬀects their provision.
In general, a club with proﬁle n and club goods demands y may impose resource
requirements in a way that is not separable by type.
Counterexample Consider an economy setting with one private and one club good,
i.e., ` = m = 1, and two types of consumers, i.e., T = 2, with the following utility
functions:
U
1 (x,y) = min(2x + 4,y);
U
2 (x,y) = min(2x + 3,2y).
Now consider a production structure for the club good that does not satisfy the















This cost function can be interpreted as representing a semi-public good of which
the provision is based on the maximal consumption capacity requested, where the
maximal capacity is maxnt.
Consider the club given by n0 = (1,1), x1
0 = x2
0 = −1, and y1
0 = y2
0 = 2. This club is
eﬃcient, as we demonstrate now.
We show that U2 cannot be lifted over its club level, 1, whenever n2 > 0,U1 = 2
(its club level), and feasibility is fulﬁlled. Invoking linear homogeneity with respect




















Hence U2(x2,y2) 5 1 indeed, proving club eﬃciency, and this level is obtained only










Lindahl pricing by p and substituting the Lindahl break-even constraint for the semi-
public goods, the sum of the consumers’ budgets is zero. Since each of them is
nonpositive, they are all zero. Better clubs must be priced higher, hence positively.
But this is not so. Consider any club with n arbitrary, (x1,y1) = (−1,2) again, but
(x2,y2) = (−1/2,1). A consumer of type 2 prefers it. This consumption bundle is
half the club-eﬃcient bundle, (x2
0,y2
0) = (−1,2), which has zero value, hence it is
aﬀordable. The eﬃcient club cannot be supported as a Lindahl equilibrium. This
completes the example.
4 Discussion
Our theorem provides price support to allocations that cannot be improved upon by
clubs. The prices are linear, unlike Mas-Colell’s (1980) personalized price schedules
(also used by Gilles and Scotchmer, 1997) or Barham and Wooders’ (1998) admission
fees or “wages.” The theorem and its proof are adaptations of Schweizer’s (1983)
theorem on club eﬃcient allocations. He obtains the Henry George Theorem for
economies with ﬁxed public goods and associated inputs and, if the latter are zero,
the welfare and core limit theorems. In the present paper, club goods are not exoge-
nous, but endogenous, namely the outcome of competition among utility maximizers.
Moreover, these club goods are not purely public, but semi-public.
After all, it is well known that there is no competitive basis for Lindahl equilibria
in pure public goods economies (Milleron, 1972, and Bewley, 1981). Wooders (1978)
has conjectured that the core shrinks when there is crowding, but Conley and Wooders
(1997) show that the second welfare theorem is generally false. Barham and Wood-
ers (1998) provides useful relationships between optima and competitive equilibria,
but all these papers concern economies with only one private and one public good.
More generally, Conley (1994) conjectures that the core of a public goods economy
11converges only in the knife-edge case in which the increasing returns to coalitional
size are precisely oﬀset by crowding, diminishing marginal returns in production, or
something similar. In a sense, we have articulated this intuition. For example, if the
public goods function is C(ny) = F + (ny)2 (everything scalar), then club eﬃciency
brings about the eﬃcient scale of production, n0y0 =
√
F. It is interesting to note,
however, that our model is quite general.
An alternative modelling of an economy with multiple public goods such that the
Lindahl equilibrium emerges, has been undertaken by Vasil’ev, Weber, and Wiesmeth
(1995). That paper uses an alternative core deﬁnition, with utility levels of members
of blocking coalitions depending on the replica size and the coalition structure. Al-
though our approach to club goods may seem cleaner, the two approaches are closely
related, in the sense that the opportunity cost of individual public — or club — goods
consumption is not reduced with the size of the economy in either paper. From this
perspective the contribution of our paper is the demonstration that Schweizer’s the-
orem encompasses the core limit theorem of Vasil’ev, Weber, and Wiesmeth (1995).
The just mentioned replication literature has attempted to provide a competitive
basis for Lindahl equilibria by modelling congestion on the demand side, while we
have kicked the problem to the supply side. In a way this is a return to the intuition
of Ellickson (1973): all that matters is the convexity of the aggregate technology
set. In fact, the convexity not only ensures the belonging of the Lindahl equilibrium
to the core, but also the coincidence of the two solution concepts as the number of
consumers varies freely. Lindahl equilibria have a competitive basis in economies with
semi-public goods.
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